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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SIEGLEIN V. SCHMIDT: PURSUANT TO § 1-206(B) OF THE
ESTATES
AND
TRUSTS
ARTICLE,
ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION
ENCOMPASSES
IN
VITRO
FERTILIZATION USING DONATED SPERM; A COURT MAY
USE THE GOLDBERGER FACTORS TO DETERMINE
VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT; A TRIAL COURT CAN
ISSUE A PERMANENT INJUNCTION FOR HARASSMENT
BASED ON § 1-203(A) OF THE FAMILY LAW ARTICLE.
By: Virginia J. Yeoman
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the term “artificial
insemination” includes in vitro fertilization using donated sperm, and that a
consenting husband is presumed to be the father of the child born as a result
of the procedure. Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647, 652, 136 A.3d 751, 754
(2016). The court also held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in finding the husband to be voluntarily impoverished or in issuing a
permanent injunction based on harassment. Id.
Stephen Sieglein (“Sieglein”) and Laura Schmidt (“Schmidt”) married in
2008. Before marrying Schmidt, Sieglein had a vasectomy. When Schmidt
desired a child, Sieglein refused to have his vasectomy reversed, but agreed
to accompany Schmidt to the Shady Grove Fertility Reproductive Science
Center (“Shady Grove”). In 2010, they both signed a consent form at Shady
Grove, which demonstrated their desire to undergo assisted reproduction
treatment, and their understanding of the risks and obligations involved.
Thereafter, Schmidt, with Sieglein’s consent, underwent in vitro artificial
insemination using donated sperm. In 2012, Schmidt gave birth to a son.
The birth certificate listed Sieglein as the father and Schmidt as the mother.
Shortly after the child’s birth, Sieglein and Schmidt separated.
Schmidt filed for divorce and requested child support in the Circuit Court
for Harford County. Schmidt also requested injunctive relief to protect her
from physical harm and harassment by Sieglein. Sieglein filed a motion
requesting that the court determine whether he was legally the parent, as
defined under section 1-206(b) of the Estates & Trusts Article (“section 1206(b)”). The circuit court held that Sieglein was the legal father of the child
and was required to pay child support. Later, the circuit court deemed
Sieglein voluntarily impoverished, and calculated his child support payments
based on his potential income. The circuit court also granted Schmidt’s
request for a permanent injunction against Sieglein to protect her from
harassment.
Sieglein appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which
affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court of special appeals explained
that the purpose of section 1-206(b) was to establish the rights and
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obligations of parents who conceive using artificial insemination. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to determine the scope of the term
artificial insemination, to review the circuit court’s discretion in the
interpretation of “voluntary impoverishment,” and to review the circuit
court’s discretion in the issuance of the permanent injunction.
The court began by analyzing Sieglein’s and Schmidt’s competing
interpretations of the term “artificial insemination.” Sieglein, 447 Md. at
660, 136 A.3d at 759. Sieglein argued that the plain meaning of artificial
insemination referred strictly to intrauterine insemination, a procedure
whereby the semen is introduced into the uterus or oviduct by artificial
means. Id. at 660 & 660 n.12, 136 A.3d at 759. Additionally, Sieglein
asserted that because in vitro fertilization did not exist at the time the statute
was enacted, the term artificial insemination as used in the statute could not
encompass that procedure. Id. at 660, 136 A.3d at 759. In contrast, Schmidt
interpreted the term to include any medical process that results in a
pregnancy by other than natural means, including in vitro fertilization. Id.
The court then looked to both standard and medical dictionaries for a
definition of artificial insemination. Sieglein, 447 Md. at 661, 136 A.3d at
760. Specifically, it researched dictionary definitions in editions published
prior to the statute’s enactment in 1969. Id. The court found multiple
definitions of artificial insemination and concluded the term was subject to
more than one interpretation, thereby rejecting Sieglein’s assertion. Id. at
662, 136 A.3d at 760.
Next, the court researched the legislative history of the statute to uncover
the lawmakers’ intent. Sieglein, 447 Md. at 662, 136 A.3d at 760. The
court’s historical research found that the addition of section 1-206(b) was
rooted in policymakers’ concerns that the increasing use of artificial
insemination by married couples would create complications regarding
inheritance rights. Sieglein, 447 Md. at 662-64, 136 A.3d at 760-61. The
court concluded that the emphasis of the statute was not on particular
techniques of artificial insemination, but on legitimizing children born from
donated sperm. Id. at 666, 136 A.3d at 763. Thus, the court held that the
definition of artificial insemination encompassed in vitro fertilization,
provided the husband consents to the procedure. Id. at 666-67, 136 A.3d at
763. As a result, Sieglein was determined to be the legal father. Id. at 670,
136 A.3d at 765.
The court next addressed Sieglein’s contention that the lower court did
not use the traditional meaning of “voluntary impoverishment” when it found
he had voluntarily impoverished himself. Sieglein, 447 Md. at 670, 136 A.3d
at 765. The term “voluntary impoverishment” is not explicitly defined
section 12-204(b) of the Family Law Article. Id. As such, the court
researched earlier versions of the statute. Id. These early versions used the
terms “voluntarily unemployed or underemployed,” which were
subsequently replaced with “voluntarily impoverished.” Id. The court also
explained that the court of special appeals had previously characterized
voluntary impoverishment as “rendering oneself voluntarily without

2016]

Sieglein v. Schmidt

77

adequate resources.” Id. at 671, 136 A.3d at 766 (citing Goldberger v.
Goldberger, 96 Md. App. 313, 624 A.2d 1328, 1335, cert. denied, 332 Md.
453, 632 A.2d 150 (1993)). Some factors to be considered in evaluating
voluntary impoverishment include the parent’s level of education, current
health, efforts to find and retain employment, and the current job market.
Sieglein, 447 Md. at 672, 136 A.3d at 766 (citing Goldberger, 96 Md. App.
at 326, 624 A.2d at 1335). Because the circuit court used these factors when
it determined that Sieglein was voluntarily impoverished, the court
concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. Sieglein, 447 Md. at
673, 136 A.3d at 767.
Finally, the court reviewed the circuit court’s issuance of a permanent
injunction against Sieglein. Sieglein, 447 Md. at 673-74, 136 A.3d at 767.
The court emphasized that under section 1-203(a) of the Family Law Article,
the lower court is authorized to issue injunctions to prevent harassment. Id.
at 674, 136 A.3d at 767. The court held that Sieglein’s actions, such as
circling around Schmidt and getting in line behind her when there was a
protective order against him, constituted harassment. Id. at 676, 136 A.3d at
769. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it entered
a permanent injunction against Sieglein. Id.
In Sieglein, the Court of Appeals of Maryland interpreted the term
“artificial insemination” to include in vitro fertilization using donated sperm.
Maryland practitioners should be aware that the court is not against
construing older statutes in a light that is favorable to modern science and
technology. Practitioners should also be aware that this holding simplifies
questions of paternity regarding artificial insemination. A husband who
consents to in vitro fertilization using donated sperm can no longer deny his
legal obligations to the child born from the procedure, as the husband is
lawfully considered the father. Consequently, this holding will encourage
judicial efficiency in a time when more and more families are opting to
undergo various artificial insemination procedures.

